THE FIGHT GOES ON FOREVER: “LIMITED
GOVERNMENT” AND THE FIRST BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES
Michael Coblenz*

I. INTRODUCTION
Hearing conservative politicians and jurists argue that the “Framers” or
the “Founders” wanted limited government always makes me wonder who
they are talking about.1 One of the first acts of the first Congress was to
create a national bank, a bank that soon became the largest commercial
enterprise in the nation. This, to me, does not sound like men who believed
in limited government.
The issue arose most recently with the debate over the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”),2 often derided by its opponents as “Obamacare.” The
rhetorical and legal challenges to the ACA were based almost entirely on the
idea that Congress lacked the authority to enact many of the provisions of the
ACA under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and specifically the socalled “individual mandate” that required all individuals to obtain health
insurance. The substance of the ACA was upheld by the Supreme Court
under the taxing authority,3 but in the dissent the four most conservative
justices, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony
Kennedy, asserted that the ACA exceeded the enumerated powers of
Congress. The dissenters noted that in recent years the Supreme Court found
limits to the power of Congress, specifically with regards to the regulation of
commerce:
In United States v. Lopez, we held that Congress could not, as a means of
fostering an educated interstate labor market through the protection of
schools, ban the possession of a firearm within a school zone. And in
United States v. Morrison, we held that Congress could not, in an effort to
*
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ensure the full participation of women in the interstate economy, subject
private individuals and companies to suit for gender motivated violent
torts.4

The dissent explained that:
[the] lesson of these cases is that the Commerce Clause, even when
supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for
doing whatever will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation
of commerce. And the last two of these cases show that the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only when the congressional
action directly violates the sovereignty of the States but also when it violates
the background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power. 5

Throughout these cases, and specifically in the ACA case,
conservatives on the Supreme Court often refer to Madison’s views on the
limits of governmental power. As Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito said in their dissent: “As for the constitutional power to tax and spend
for the general welfare: The Court has long since expanded that beyond (what
Madison thought it meant) taxing and spending for those aspects of the
general welfare that were within the Federal Government’s enumerated
powers.”6
Justice Thomas filed a short dissent in the ACA case agreeing that the
“Individual Mandate is beyond the power granted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.”7 He then said that
the modern interpretation of the “Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the
original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early
Commerce Clause cases.”8 He referred to his more lengthy analysis of that
topic in his concurrence in the case of United States v. Lopez, where he said:
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison
wrote: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (internal citations omitted, but citing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–63 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19
(2000)).
Id.
Id. at 2643 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936)).
Id. at 2677.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
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authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). Just
as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.9

Thomas, and conservatives on and off the bench, assert that the framers’
intent was to create a government with strictly limited and enumerated
power. The creation of the First Bank of the United States, by the First
Congress, seems to throw that idea for a loop. The First Bank was more than
just a bank—a depository of money and a commercial lending institution—
it was the largest single commercial enterprise in the nation.10 So the First
Congress, with many Framers as members, created a government owned
business, which became the largest single commercial enterprise in the
nation.
Conservatives frequently quote James Madison as though he is an
oracle, and the sole source of wisdom regarding what the framers intended.
But what if some “framers” didn’t agree with Madison? What if more
“framers” supported the Bank of the United States, and Alexander
Hamilton’s more expansive view of Congressional power than Madison’s
views of limited powers? What does it say about the framers’ belief in
“enumerated powers” and “limited government” when a majority of the
“framers” in the First Congress rejected Madison’s views? This Article will
address these questions.
The issue involves the meaning of the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the interplay between the two. These
issues arose during the Constitutional Convention, and were discussed during
the ratification process. These arguments are described in the first section.
The second section details the debate in the First Congress over the Bank of
the United States, and describes how Congressmen and “framers” interpreted
these two clauses. The Bank Bill then went to President Washington for his
signature, and Washington sought the advice of his senior advisers. Their
analysis is outlined in the third section. The final section tallies which
framers supported the Bank, and an expansive view of the powers of
Congress, versus the framers who opposed the Bank, and therefore wanted
to restrict the powers of Congress. Notably, twice as many framers in the
first government supported the Bank as opposed it.

9.
10.

Id. at 552 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
DAVID JACK COWEN, THE ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1791–1797, at xxiv (2000).
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II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE POWER OF CONGRESS
A. Introduction
The First Bank of the United States was part of Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton’s attempt to turn the United States into a mercantile
nation to rival Great Britain. Hamilton proposed the First Bank during the
first Congress, but he had long hoped that the new nation would be a
mercantile power on par with England.11 Hamilton knew, however, that the
new nation would not rival England’s mercantile power due to the chaotic
and unorganized state of the nation under the Articles of Confederation.12 A
number of other prominent men, including James Madison and George
Washington, were also concerned about the chaotic state of the nascent
nation.13 States were in open conflict over borders and commercial issues
including imports and tariffs.14 In the fall of 1786, Hamilton and Madison
met with a group of like-minded individuals at Annapolis, Maryland, to
discuss the inability of the Government under the Articles of Confederation
to deal with these issues.15 The Report from the Annapolis Conference noted
that the delegates met
to take into consideration the trade and Commerce of the United States, to
consider how far an uniform system in their commercial intercourse and
regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent
harmony, and to report to the several States such an Act, relative to this
great object.16

The delegates were not able to reach an agreement at Annapolis, so they
proposed a subsequent meeting, tentatively scheduled for the following
summer in Philadelphia, to discuss amending the Articles of Incorporation
“to render the constitution of the Federal government adequate to the
exigencies of the Union.”17 It was common knowledge that “the exigencies

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 344–49 (2004).
Id.
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 5–8 (1966).
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8–10.
PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSIONERS TO REMEDY DEFECTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1786),
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp#1.
Id.
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of the Union” involved the various problems with trade and the commercial
relations between the states.18
B. The Purpose of the Constitutional Convention
Although one of the main purposes of the Constitutional Convention
was to address the ability of the government to regulate commerce,19 there is
relatively little discussion of commercial issues in the record we have of the
Convention.20 There are many possible reasons for this. Perhaps the framers
understood that the purpose of the new government was to actively engage
in the regulation of commercial matters between the states, and so the issue
warranted little discussion. Another possible reason is that the Framers
actively debated the issue outside of the Convention, but with the limited
surviving record we cannot say.
The lack of a record was by design. At the beginning of the Convention
the delegates were sworn to secrecy;21 the purpose was to allow the delegates
to speak freely, and to prevent details from leaking out and generating public
discussion and potential opposition before the work was done. The purpose
was not to prevent later generations from learning about the “intent” of the
framers, but that was the effect, at least until Madison’s notes were published
in 1840.22 Because of this rule there is a very limited record of the
proceedings. There was an official record of topics and speakers, but no
official transcript of discussions. A few other delegates took notes, including
Hamilton, Rufus King, William Pierce, James McHenry, William Paterson,
and Robert Yates, but these were cursory and incomplete. The most detailed
notes were compiled by James Madison.23

18.
19.
20.

21.

22.
23.

CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 42–43 (1986).
BOWEN, supra note 13, at 6–11.
The record is limited to the Official Journal, and notes of a number of Delegates, including James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, William Pierce, James McHenry, William Paterson,
and Robert Yates. Madison’s notes are the most extensive and generally considered the best record
of the Convention. These notes are available on-line at numerous sources, perhaps the best is Yale
University’s Avalon Project: Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). The Journal and notes are collected in, MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1996).
COLLIER, supra note 18, at 113–14; see also James Madison’s Notes On the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, Tuesday, May 29, 1787, NAT’L HERITAGE CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDIES, http://www.nhccs.org/dfc-0529.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (W.W. Norton,
1987) (1840). Note some of the other’s notes were published soon thereafter.
The notes of the debates and the official record are collated in FARRAND, supra note 20.
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B. Enumerated Powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause
The Virginia Plan, written by James Madison and Edmund Randolph,
and presented at the Convention by Randolph on May 29, was the framework
for much of the debate over the form of the new government.24 The plan set
out a list of fifteen “resolutions” regarding the form of a new nation.25 The
Sixth Resolution set out the powers of the proposed National Legislature, and
said that it
shall have the power to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws
passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National
Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union
against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles
thereof.26

Essentially Madison’s proposal was that the national legislature would
have all powers not held by the states, which is the broadest possible degree
of power. This was initially approved, but as the balance of power shifted
among the states, particularly regarding the make-up of the two chambers of
the legislature, the issue was readdressed. When the Committee of Detail
was appointed to create a draft constitution for discussion, they took it upon
themselves to set out a list of specifically enumerated Congressional
powers.27 When the Convention discussed the draft and the specifically
enumerated powers, they debated whether specific provisions should be set
out or if particular matters fell under the general grant of authority to the
government.28 On August 18, Madison proposed a list of specifically
enumerated powers, which included the power “to grant charters of
incorporation where the public good may require them.”29 Charles Pinkney
proposed his own list, which also included the power to “grant charters of

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

BOWEN, supra note 13, at 38; see also ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING
FATHER 15 (1987).
The Virginia Plan is available on-line at the Yale Avalon History web site. See Variant Texts of the
Virginia Plan, Presented by Edmund Randolph to the Federal Convention, May 29, 1787. Text A,
LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vatexta.asp (last
visited Mar. 18, 2015).
Id.
COLLIER, supra note 18, at 190.
Id. at 190–91.
Madison Debates August 18, LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
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incorporation.”30 This specific provision, along with a number of others, was
eventually removed.31 The record of the debate does not indicate whether it
was removed because the delegates did not want to grant that power to
Congress (Madison’s suggested view), or because they considered it a
general power that the national government would inherently have, and
therefore need not be set out in the Constitution.
The Committee of Detail also included a version of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.32 As details of a specific list of powers was debated, the
verbiage of the Necessary and Proper Clause was tweaked, but the substance
of this provision was not subject to any recorded debate. It was modified
only slightly by the Committee on Style and ended up in the final document.33
The final version of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce between the states, and internationally,34 but it also
contains the “necessary and proper clause,” which seems to expand the
specifically delineated powers of Congress.
While there was little specific debate over the Necessary and Proper
Clause, there were a number of delegates who objected to the clause because
they thought that it expanded the powers of Congress to regulate almost
anything, so long as they could conceivably state that it was “necessary” or
“proper.” The chief opponent was George Mason of Virginia. Mason raised
his objections in only a cursory manner at the end of the convention when he
explained why he refused to sign the final document,35 but he circulated a
letter afterwards, which described his objections.36 His primary complaint
was the lack of a Bill of Rights, but he also noted the potential problems
created by the Necessary and Proper Clause.37 His letter became the basis
for a number of attacks on the Constitution regarding what Mason derisively
called “the sweeping clause” because it swept up all powers to the federal
government.38

30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

Id.
COLLIER, supra note 18, at 190–91.
Id. at 190.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer thereof.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.”).
COLLIER, supra note 15, at 255. Mason’s primary opposition over the lack a bill of rights.
See infra text accompanying note 34.
GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in MERRILL JENSEN, ET AL., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION [hereinafter “DHRC”] 348–51 (1976).
Id.
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D. Ratification and the Powers of Congress
After the document was signed on September 17, 1789, it was sent to
the Congress of the Confederation, and to the thirteen state capitals for
ratification.39 The proposed Constitution was the subject of almost
immediate discussion and the subject of numerous essays and articles in the
newspapers across the country. Some of the first to write were the opponents,
who eventually became known as the “Anti-Federalists.”40
1. The “Anti-Federalists”
George Mason’s letter was one of the first to critique the Constitution,
and it became the basis for a number of subsequent objections. Among his
other objections, Mason complained about the “necessary and proper”
clause, which he derided as the “sweeping clause.”41 The danger of this
provision, he said, was that:
Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of the
enumerated powers, the Congress may . . . extend their powers as far as they
shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the
powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights. 42

Barely a month after the close of the Constitutional Convention, another
skeptic of the new document, who called himself “Brutus,” voiced his
objection to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which he termed the “elastic
clause,” in an essay published in a New York paper in October 1787.
This government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable power,
legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it
extends, [because one clause] declared “that the Congress shall have power
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
39.

40.
41.
42.

BOWEN, supra note 13, at 263–68. Note, there were numerous “congresses” in the early nation,
and they often went by similar names. For clarity’s sake I will refer to the Congress of the colonies
during the Revolution and before the creation of the Articles of Confederation as the Continental
Congress. I will refer to the Congress that met and governed under the Articles of Confederation
as the Congress of the Confederation, and later during the debate over the Bank Bill I will refer to
the newly elected Congress as the First Congress.
BOWEN, supra note 13, at 268.
Id.
GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in DHRC, supra note 37, at 348–51, available at
http://www.constitution.org/gmason/objections.html.
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constitution, in the government of the United States; or in any department
or office thereof.”
....
A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, . . . is a
power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for ought I know, be
exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures, . . .
annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single
government.43

Another complaint about this provision is that the clause leaves it to
Congress to decide what was necessary and proper. This was the argument
of the “Old Whig,” writing in Philadelphia in October 1787:
Under such a clause as this can any thing be said to be reserved and kept
back from Congress? Can it be said that the Congress have no power but
what is expressed. “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper”
is in other words to make all such laws which the Congress shall think
necessary and proper, — for who shall judge for the legislature what is
necessary and proper? — Who shall set themselves above the sovereign?
— What inferior legislature shall set itself above the supreme legislature?
To me it appears that no other power on earth can dictate to them or control
them, unless by force.
Where then is the restraint? How are Congress bound down to the
powers expressly given? What is reserved or can be reserved?44

2. The Federalists
Hamilton read these and other critical essays with concern. He
published a few essays in support of the Constitution, but decided that a more
organized response was needed.45 He discussed the matter with a number of
Framers, but eventually only John Jay and James Madison committed to
producing a series of essays.46 They produced a total of eighty-five essays,
but only a handful specifically dealt with the powers of Congress and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.47
The authors of the Federalists were in a tough spot. On one hand they
had to convince some people that the new government would be more
43.

44.

45.
46.
47.

“Brutus,” published in the New York Journal, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 271–75 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986);
see also DHRC, supra note 37, at vol. VIII, 412–21, at 413–14. This was the first of three essays
by Brutus.
The Old Whig 2, reprinted in DHRC, supra note 37, at 402-03; see also THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1971), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/
library/index.asp?document=1937.
CHERNOW, supra note 11, at 243–46.
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 246–49.
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effective, and hence have more power, than the government under the
Articles of Confederation. But at the same time they had to convince the
skeptics, typified by the Anti-Federalists, that the new government was not
overly powerful. The result was that at times the Federalists seem like they
were trying to have it both ways.
Modern conservatives like to quote Madison from Federalist No. 45:
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.”48
But there are a number of other essays that deal with the scope of
Congressional power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The first was
Federalist No. 23, written by Alexander Hamilton, and published on
December 21, 1787.
Hamilton first addressed the power of Congress to enact laws relating
to the common defense. He said that these powers:
[O]ught to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY
OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM.
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power
to which the care of it is committed . . . .49

But this broad grant of authority is not just necessary for matters of
national defense, it is necessary for all matters under Congressional authority,
including commerce. “The same must be the case in respect to commerce,
and to every other matter to which its [Congress] jurisdiction is permitted to
extend.”50 This, according to Hamilton, is necessary for a competent
government. 51
Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end,
would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and
improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are
disabled from managing them with vigor and success . . . . A government,
the constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers
which a free people OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT,

48.
49.
50.
51.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis in
original).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124 (emphasis in original).

2015]

The Fight Goes on Forever

401

would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL
INTERESTS.52

In Federalist No. 33, published on January 3, 1788, Hamilton discussed
the powers of taxation, and attempted to explain that the Necessary and
Proper Clause did not expand this to render the power to tax absolute.53 He
noted that there had been complaints about this provision by opponents of
the Constitution.54 He did not identify them, but it seems likely that he was
referring to the “Brutus” and the “Old Whig,” among others. He then said
that the Necessary and Proper Clause was “only declaratory of a truth which
would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very
act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified
powers.”55
Hamilton explained the purpose of the clause with a bit of conclusory
logic:
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the
ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to
its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making
LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but
LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a
LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and
collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but
NECESSARY and PROPER laws?56

He then addressed the question, raised by “The Old Whig,” of who decided
what is necessary and proper?
Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and PROPRIETY of the laws . . . [The]
national government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of
the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the
federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and
make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must
appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress
the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and
prudence justify.57

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 124 (emphasis in original).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 169–73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
Id.
Id. at 170 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 171.
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So Congress can be its own judge of what is necessary and proper, but
ultimately the members of Congress must stand for election, and if the public
disagrees with what Congress has done, they can remove those
representatives and elect new ones more in line with their thinking.
A few weeks later, Madison set out the most specific and detailed
analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as a broad overview of
the scope of federal powers, in Federalist No. 44. No. 44 is the continuation
of a series starting with No. 41, which goes through, point by point, the
powers of the Federal Government. The main thrust of these essays is how
the Constitution actually limits the national power by clearly delineating the
various things that the government can do. After setting out all of the powers
under various provisions of the Constitution, including an extensive
explanation of the powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8,
Madison addressed the Necessary and Proper Clause.58 He noted that “Few
parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than
this,”59 but he proclaimed that “[w]ithout the SUBSTANCE of this power,
the whole Constitution would be a dead letter.”60 Since the substance is
necessary, he then asked how the Constitution could have expressed this
grant of authority.61 Madison suggested that there are basically four
“methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject.”62 First,
the framers “might have copied the second article of the existing
Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not
EXPRESSLY delegated.”63
Had the convention [done this] it is evident that the new Congress would be
continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of
construing the term “EXPRESSLY” with so much rigor as to disarm the
government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to
destroy altogether the force of the restriction. 64

In other words, the fight would have been over the meaning of the
concept of “expressed” powers. This possibility was discussed and rejected
at the Constitutional Convention. As noted, the Articles of Confederation
were widely considered ineffectual in large measure because the central

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 251-56 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
Id. at 252. Note: The organization of the essay has been reformatted for clarity and simplicity.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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government lacked sufficient powers to deal with national matters, and the
framers wanted a more able government.
Second, the framers “might have attempted a positive enumeration of
the powers comprehended under the general terms ‘necessary and proper.’”65
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt
would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which
the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of
things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in
every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS,
which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must
always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst
the object remains the same.66

This too was discussed at the Convention. At one point both Madison
and Charles Pinckney attempted to draw up lists of specifically delegated
powers, but it became obvious that this was unworkable, and was rejected.67
Third, the framers “might have attempted a negative enumeration . . .
by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition.”68
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not
necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task
would have been no less chimerical [that listing granted powers]; and would
have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the
enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.69

In other words anything not prohibited would have been assumed
allowed. This was not specifically discussed at the Convention, but Madison
likely sets it out to show that it too would be unworkable.
Fourth, “they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving
these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.”70
Had the Constitution been silent on this head [as it was], there can be no
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the
general powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 252–53.
See supra text accompanying notes 24–27; see also James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787, Debates of August 18, 1787,
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0818.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 58, at 253.
Id.
Id. at 252.
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implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a
general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for
doing it is included.71

Madison stole a march on potential critics by asking, hypothetically,
what the consequence would be if Congress overreached and exerted powers
not authorized:
I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power
vested in them; . . . In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will
depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound
and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must
be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more faithful
representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers.72

In other words, the president and the judiciary would serve as a check
on Congressional power, and ultimately, if the people objected they could
elect new representatives.
In Federalist No. 45, Madison discussed the apportionment of power
between the states and the federal government. He was apparently
addressing the Anti-Federalist argument that the federal government overly
encroached upon the state governments, and perhaps even supplanted them.73
He began the essay by reviewing the history of some other confederations
and noted that in most cases the general government failed not because it
assumed too much power but because of encroachment of powers by the
state.74 Then he noted that under the system proposed by the Constitution
the federal government is largely controlled by the states.75 First the elected
members of the federal government are largely beholden to the states.76 The
President, he noted, cannot be elected “without the intervention of the State
legislatures,” Senators are selected by the state legislatures, and
Representatives, while elected by the people, “will be chosen very much
under the influence of that class of men” who are in the state legislatures.77
He then noted that the federal government will have relatively few employees
when compared to the state governments.78 He described tax collectors,
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 253.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 258–60.
Id. at 259.
Id.
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justices of the peace, militia officers and the like.79 It is when describing the
various government employees that he noted that the “powers delegated by
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.”80 The main power of the federal government would be to deal
with war and peace, while the states would be left to deal with “the ordinary
course of affairs, concerning the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people.”81
Madison and Hamilton wrote another forty essays, and the Federalists
were important in defining the scope of the Constitution for the delegates to
the ratifying conventions and convincing enough of them to eventually ratify
the Constitution. One of the complaints of the opponents was the lack of a
Bill of Rights to protect individual rights, and a number of states ratified with
the condition that a Bill of Rights be added to the Constitution.82 A number
of states included proposed amendments in their ratification documents. 83
New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in June of 1788,
which meant that it could take effect, and Virginia and New York
subsequently ratified.84 Elections were held in late 1788, and the first
government under the Constitution was sworn-in in January 1789. Then the
First Congress began the difficult task of putting the Constitution into effect
and creating a working national government. There were a number of
arguments over the scope of the powers of Congress and the Government
during the First Congress, but the most detailed and illuminating involved
Alexander Hamilton’s plan for a National Bank.
III. THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE POWERS
OF CONGRESS
The Constitution created a rough outline for a new government, but it
fell to the First Congress to create the institutions of a working government.
The First Congress established the Judiciary, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Department of War, they selected the site for the new national capital
(spoiler alert: they picked a location on the Potomac) and established
provisions for the Federal assumption of the states’ Revolutionary War

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
See BOWEN, supra note 13, at 282–305.
Id.
Id. at 293–306.

406

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

debts.85 The First Congress also created a Treasury Department,86 and
President Washington appointed his friend and former aide-de-camp,
Alexander Hamilton, as the first Secretary of the Treasury.87 Hamilton
wanted to transform the new nation into a mercantile power to rival
England.88 In early 1790, Hamilton submitted his “First Report on the Public
Credit” to Congress, which was the first part of his plan, and described the
nation’s finances in general and government finances in particular, and
suggested that the national government assume the state debts acquired to
fight the Revolutionary War.89 This issue was the subject of heated debate
throughout the year, but Congress eventually agreed that the federal
government would assume the war debt.90 On December 23, 1790, Hamilton
submitted his “Report on a National Bank” to Congress, which included a
proposal for the establishment of a national bank.91
The Report again addressed the financial problems facing the new
nation and government, and explained how a national bank would help deal
with many of these problems.92 The Report did not specifically address
whether Congress had the authority to establish a bank, but did note that a
bank would assist the nation in levying and collecting taxes, borrowing
money, and raising and supplying an army and navy93 The Report
culminated in a draft bill for the establishment of a national bank.94

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

See, e.g., CHARLES BANGS BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789–1791 (1989); See also Documenting the History of the First
Federal Congress, 1789–1791, FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS PROJECT, http://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1789).
CHERNOW, supra note 11, at 286–88.
Id. at 291, 297–98.
Id. at 297-305; see also The First Report on Public Credit by Alexander Hamilton (1789),
http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/resources/documents/ch08_02.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2015).
BICKFORD & BOWLING, supra note 85, at 67–69.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY ON A NATIONAL BANK (1790),
reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789–
MARCH 3, 1791, at 171 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit, eds., 2004) [hereinafter
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A. The Senate Enacts a Bank Charter Bill
The Senate officially received Hamilton’s report on December 23,
1790, and appointed a committee to evaluate it, and draft a Senate version of
the Bill. The committee was made up of Caleb Strong of Massachusetts,
Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, Philip Schuyler of New York, Pierce Butler
of South Carolina, and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. Strong, Morris,
Butler, and Ellsworth were all at the Constitutional Convention (and were,
therefore “framers”), and all except Butler ultimately supported the Bank
Bill. On January 3, 1791, the Committee presented the Senate with their
version of the Bill. The Senate Bill was nearly identical in substance to
Hamilton’s Bill, but with provisions numbered and reordered slightly.95 The
Committee, made up of four “framers,” raised no concerns about the ability
of Congress to create a national bank under the Constitution. While we do
not know, because of the limited record, we can assume based on the debate
in the House that followed, that they simply assumed that the new
government had that power.96
The Bill was given two readings before substantive debate began on
January 13, 1791.97 The first substantive issue involved the duration of the
Bank.98 Hamilton’s proposal, adopted by the committee, was for the Bank
to exist as long as the national debt existed.99 There was a motion to limit
the term of incorporation to seven years.100 This was debated without any
record of a vote, and a second motion was made for the charter to terminate
on March 4, 1815.101 This motion passed, without record of the votes.102 A
subsequent motion was made to allow unlimited duration, but with a
provision that the charter could be terminated at any time with a twelve
month notice.103 This was debated and rejected.104 A motion was made to
limit the charter to March 4, 1811.105 While this was being debated a
subsequent motion was made to limit the charter to March 4, 1801.106 This
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.

1 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 522.
See infra text accompanying notes 73–164.
1 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 522–31. Note the Senate record does not contain a transcript or record
the substance of the debate.
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 532–33. Under the Constitution of the time, the new administration was sworn in on March
4. Each of these proposals set dates corresponding to the beginning of a new Presidential
administration.
Id. at 535.

408

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

vote was recorded, and the motion was defeated sixteen to six.107 The six
voting to strictly limit the duration of the Bank Charter were Pierce Butler
and Ralph Izard of South Carolina, William Few and James Gunn of Georgia,
Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina, and James Monroe of Virginia.108
Both Butler and Few were framers. It is notable that while no Senator
questioned the constitutionality of the Bill, those who objected were all from
the South. With this vote the charter was granted until March 4, 1811.109
The next matter, discussed only briefly, was the removal of a section
that would prevent the chartering of any other bank, thereby granting a
monopoly to the National Bank.110 This was rejected by a vote of eighteen
to five. The five opposed were Butler, Few, Hawkins, Izard, and Monroe,
five of the six men who supported a strict time limit on the Bank. This was
the last proposed amendment to the Bank Bill, and with this vote a resolution
was enacted stating that the Bill passed, and should be sent to the House.111
The objectors wanted to limit the power of the Bank, but did not raise
concerns about the Bank’s constitutionality. The objectors included two
framers, Few and Butler. Their objections were noted by Senator William
Maclay of Pennsylvania, who later published a diary of his service in the First
Senate.112 His diary included only a few brief lines regarding the discussion
of the Bank Bill. He noted that Izard, Butler, and Monroe, along with one
other member whose name was illegible in the diary but was probably either
Few or Hawkins based on their recorded votes, opposed the Bank Bill.113 In
the diary entry of January 11, Maclay said: “The ostensible object held out
by Butler & Izard were that the publick should have all the advantages of the
Bank. But they showed no foundation for this.”114
There was no recorded discussion in the Senate over whether Congress
had the authority to charter a bank. We cannot get into the heads of the
members, but based on the subsequent debate in the House, can assume that
they simply believed that Congress had this power. This lack of debate over
the constitutionality of the Bank was noted during the debate in the House.115
There were twenty-six Senators in the First Congress, and ten were
framers. Not a single one questioned the constitutionality of the Bank. The
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id. Note the debate took place over a couple of days, with other business intervening.
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 536.
The Diary of Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania, in 9 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 359.
Id.
Id.
Fisher Ames noted the lack of discussion generally, see infra text accompanying notes 163–81, and
John Vining specifically mentions the lack of discussion in the Senate, see infra text accompanying
note 275-76.
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eight framers who supported the bank were Richard Bassett and George Read
of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth and William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut,
Rufus King and Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, John Langdon of New
Hampshire, and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania.116 The two framers who
opposed the Bank were Pierce Butler of South Carolina and William Few of
Georgia.117 They clearly disapproved of the Bank, but never questioned
whether Congress had the authority to create a bank. Chart 1 in the appendix
shows the Senators and their status as Framer and position on the Bank Bill.
B. The House Considers the Bank Bill
The House received the Bank Bill on January 21, 1791, but did not take
it up in detail until the third reading on February 1, 1791.118 After the third
reading, William Smith of South Carolina rose to complain that there had
been no opportunity to debate the Bill, and moved to send the Bill back to
committee.119 This was the first sign of opposition in the House, but the
floodgates opened. James Jackson of Georgia agreed and said he opposed
the Bill entirely.120 Jackson was a planter, lawyer, and former state legislator,
but had not participated in either the Constitutional Convention, or the
Georgia ratifying convention.121 He said that a bank would only benefit the
mercantile interests on the northern states and would particularly harm
farmers.122 He said that there was already a “National” bank—the Bank of
North America—which had been chartered by the Congress of the
Confederation.123 He also noted that Congress did not have the power to
grant a monopoly to one bank, and cited the Federalists No. 23 and No. 44
to that end.124 He did not, at this point, argue that Congress lacked the
authority to charter a bank.
John Laurance of New York, a chief supporter of the Bank, rose to
defend the Bill.125 Laurance was a lawyer and former state legislator but had
not been part of the Constitutional Convention or his state’s ratifying

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

1 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 531–32.
Id.
14 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 359.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 845–52.
Id. at 363.
The Bank of North America was chartered by the Congress of the Confederation on December 31,
1781, to help finance the war.
124. 14 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 363–64. Note, the debates in the House are compiled in the DHFFC
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125. Id. at 364.
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convention.126 He said that the government had the power to borrow money,
and that under the Articles of Confederation the Bank of North America had
been chartered to facilitate this.127 He said that the new federal government
“is vested with powers equal to those of the late confederation,”128 and
therefore must have this power.
Debate over the Bank Bill occupied the House for the next week. On
February 2, James Madison made his first detailed analysis of the Bank and
the question of constitutionality.129 He was opposed to the Bank, but began
with a description of the advantages and disadvantages of a bank, and noted
that there were many advantages.130 Despite the advantages, however, he
said that he did not believe Congress had the power to charter a bank.131 He
noted that there had been a proposal during the Constitutional Convention to
give Congress the power to grant charters, but that proposal had been
rejected.132
Madison was partially correct about the proposal during the
Convention, though other framers would remember and describe the situation
differently, as we shall see in a moment. The record of the debate does not
indicate whether it was removed because the delegates did not want to grant
that power to Congress (Madison’s suggested view), or because they
considered it a general power that the national government would inherently
have, and therefore need not be set out in the Constitution (the position of the
supporters of the Bank, see below.)133
Madison said that the powers of the federal government were limited.134
The government was not created by a general grant of power, but a grant of
particular powers only, leaving most powers in the hands of the states or “the
people.”135 Because of this, Madison said he could find no power to
incorporate a bank in (1) the power to lay and collect taxes to pay debts, (2)
the power to borrow money, (3) the power to pass laws necessary and proper

126. Id. at 718–22.
127. Id. at 364.
128. Id. Note, the published news accounts do not contain quotations set out in quotation marks, so it is
difficult to determine if the reporter is transcribing actual statements or simply paraphrasing. I will
add quotations for clarity and readability but only where it appears from the context of the news
report that the statement is likely a direct quote.
129. Id. at 367.
130. Id. at 367–68.
131. Id. at 369.
132. Id. at 368.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 23–28.
134. 14 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 369.
135. Id.
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to carry into execution those powers, or (4) the power to promote the general
welfare in the preamble.136
He said that if the national government could charter a bank it would
interfere with the power of the states to incorporate banks, or more
importantly to prohibit the incorporation of banks.137 If Congress could
incorporate a bank it could conceivably incorporate anything, including a
state religion.138 He distinguished this from the Bank of North America,
which he called “a child of necessity,” and asserted that it exceeded the
powers granted under the Articles of Confederation, as shown by the fact that
the Congress of the Confederation had requested that the states also
incorporate the Bank.139
Next, Madison discussed whether the Bank could be allowed under the
“necessary and proper” clause, either alone or in conjunction with
enumerated powers.140 He said the meaning of this clause must
according to the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be
limited to means necessary to the end, and incidental to the nature of the
specific powers . . . . In this sense it had been explained by the friends of
the constitution, and ratified by the state conventions.141

In other words, this provision only applied to specifically enumerated
powers. Madison continued:
The essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited
and enumerated powers, would be destroyed: if instead of direct and
incidental means, any means could be used, which in the language of the
preamble to the [Bank] bill, ‘might be conceived to be conductive to the
successful conducting of the finances; or might be conceived to tend to give
facility to the obtaining of loans.’
....
[If Congress] by virtue of the power to borrow, can create the means of
lending, and in pursuance of these means, can incorporate a Bank, they
many do anything whatever creative of like means. 142
....
The doctrine of implication is always a tender one . . . . Mark the
reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To borrow money is
made the end and the accumulation of capitals, implied as the means. The
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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accumulation of capitals is then the end, and a bank implied as the means.
The bank is then the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital
punishments, etc., implies the means. If implications, thus remote and thus
multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach
every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of
political economy.143

Madison said that the Constitution specifically sets out important
powers, and leaves only the less important powers to implication.144 For
example, Congress has the power to regulate money, and it is expressly
granted the power to punish counterfeiters.145 It has the power to declare war,
and then was expressly granted the power to raise an army.146 Madison
wrote, “It is not pretended that every insertion or omission in the constitution
is the effect of systematic attention. This is the not the character of any human
work . . . . Important powers are expressly asserted, not implied, and the
creation of the bank is an important power.”147
Madison distinguished between a power necessary and proper for the
government, and a power necessary and proper for executing an enumerated
power.148 In the later, the incidental “necessary” powers were not expressed,
but drawn from the nature of each enumerated power. In the former, the
powers of the government were expressly enumerated.149 “This constituted
the peculiar nature of the government, no power therefore not enumerated,
could be inferred from the general nature of government.”150
Madison said that the discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
the state ratifying conventions had all turned on the same fundamental
principle that the term “necessary and proper” gave no additional powers to
those enumerated.151 He then read sections of the ratifying debates from
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina to support his contention.152
Madison then read proposed limits on Federal power from the ratifying
conventions, which eventually became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
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implying that these proposed limitations indicated a desire to limit the power
of government.153 Then he summarized his arguments:
It appears on the whole that the power exercised by the bill was condemned
by the silence of the constitution; was condemned by the rule of
interpretation arising out of the constitution; was condemned by its
tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the constitution; was
condemned by the expositions of the friends of the constitution . . . , was
condemned by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified the
constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by
Congress themselves to the Constitution” and he hoped would be
condemned now by Congress.154

James Jackson agreed with Madison that nothing in the Constitution
gave Congress the power to incorporate a bank, and the fact that the Congress
of the Confederation chartered the Bank of North America was not applicable
because that occurred during wartime.155
William Giles of Virginia said that while a bank might be used to help
borrow money, a bank was not necessary to achieve that purpose.156 Giles
was a lawyer and had been a colonial legislator but had not participated in
either the Constitutional Convention or his state ratifying convention.157 He
also noted that the Constitution was ratified based on the proposition that the
new government was one of limited powers, and if it could charter a bank it
could do almost anything, thus obviating the idea of limited powers.158
John Vining of Delaware said that he supported the Bank because of its
obvious usefulness, and noted that the power to incorporate could be found
in both express powers and those arising from necessary implication.159
Vining was a merchant, a state legislator, and a state delegate to the Congress
of the Confederation, but had not attended the Constitutional Convention or
participated in his state’s ratifying convention.160 He said that the
“Constitution was a dead letter if implied powers were not to be exercised.”
He also noted that the old government had chartered a bank, and that the new
government had power “more extensive that the old one possessed.”161
Debate continued the next day with a side discussion regarding the
financing of the Bank. Some members wanted potential subscribers to be
153.
154.
155.
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able to use state bank notes to purchase shares of the National Bank, but this
proposal was rejected thirty-eight to twenty-one.162 This debate over
substantive provisions of the Bill, and the outcome of the vote, seemed to
indicate a good deal of support for the Bank, even after Madison’s argument.
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts was a leading sponsor of the Bank Bill.
He was not a framer, but was a prominent lawyer in Massachusetts and a
forceful advocate for ratification in the Massachusetts ratifying
convention.163 In many ways his arguments were a mirror image of
Madison’s. Ames noted that Madison had always been an opponent of banks,
including the Bank of North America chartered by the Congress of the
Confederation.164 Ames expressed shock that he was only now hearing these
constitutional objections to the Bank Bill. “Why did he [Madison] suffer the
Bill to pass the committee in silence?”165 He also expressed surprise that, in
the weeks that the Bill had been before Congress, there had been no public
complaint.
It seems strange too that in our enlightened country, the public should have
been involved in equal blindness. While the exercise of even the lawful
powers of government is disputed, and a jealous eye is fixed on its
proceedings, not a whisper has been heard against its authority to establish
a bank.166

This, and the public’s acceptance of the Bank of North America, was, for
him, “sufficient proof of their opinion on the subject.”167 Ames admitted that
the power to create a bank was not expressly granted by the Constitution, but
said that Congress had added powers by implication, and virtually everything
Congress has done since the beginning has been through some assumption of
a broader power than that set out in the Constitution.168
If Congress may not make laws conformably to the powers plainly implied,
tho not expressed in the frame of the government, it is rather late in the day
to adopt it as a principle of conduct: A great part of our two year’s labor is
lost . . . for we have scarcely made a law in which we have not exercised
our discretion with regard to the true intent of the constitution. 169
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He said that by the very nature of the government, the legislature had
an implied power of using every means not positively prohibited by the
Constitution, to execute the ends for which that government was
constituted.170 “Every constitutional right should be so liberally constructed
as to effect the public good.”171
There “was as much danger in doing too little as in doing too much,”
Ames said, and noted a number of recent matters where Congress addressed
matters and used powers not expressly set out in the Constitution, including
redeeming captives from Algeria and creating a land office to deal with land
issues in the Northwest Territories. “The power here was derived by
implication, and was deduced from the reason and necessity of the case.”172
Ames said that the “power of establishing banks . . . could be deduced from
the same source: From their utility in the ordinary operations of government,
and their indispensible necessity in cases of sudden emergencies.”173
Ames’s comment about the western land office was a reference to the
establishment of a land office in the Northwest Territories (present day Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois) to manage the sale of government owned land.174 A
number of other Congressmen referred to this Bill. The implication was that
if Congress lacked the power to charter a corporation, why had they done so
for the land office in the Northwest Territories? And, if certain members
now believed that Congress lacked this power, why had they not objected
then? The objection, as Ames noted, is not to a corporate charter generally,
but to a bank specifically.
Ames said that this power to charter a bank would fall under the power
to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, and regulate for the general
welfare.175 While these provisions do not specifically mention the creation
of a bank, Ames said that “unless a reasonable latitude of construction of this
part of the constitution was allowed he did not see upon what authority
several acts of Congress would rest.”176
Ames then said that while those opposed to the Bank complained about
the assumption of powers by Congress,
[D]o they mark out the limits of the power which they will leave to us, with
more certainty than is done by advocates of the bank? Their rules of
interpretation by contemporaneous testimony, the debates of conventions,
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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and the doctrine of substantive and auxiliary powers, will be found obscure,
and of course as formidable, as that which they condemn. They only set up
one construction against another.177

Ames then described his broad understanding of the powers of Congress.
Congress may do what is necessary to the end for which the constitution
was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural rights of man, or to
those which they have expressly reserved to themselves, or to the powers
which are assigned to the states . . . That construction may be maintained to
be a safe one which promotes the good of society, and the ends for which
the government was adopted . . . .178

Ames said that he “had no desire to extend the powers granted by the
constitution beyond the limits prescribed them,” but in those cases where
there was doubt as to its meaning and intention, he thought it was his duty to
consult his “conscience and judgment to solve them.”179
Ames concluded by observing that “we had felt the disadvantages of
the confederation—we adopted the constitution expecting to place the
national affairs under a federal head . . . .”180 Presumably the purpose of this
Constitution is to wield power a bit more broadly than the Confederation.181
Debate continued the next day, February 4, with Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts, a supporter of the Bank. Sedgwick had been a member of the
Congress of the Confederation and the state legislature, and had taken an
active role in ratification, but was not a framer.182 Sedgwick said that until a
few days ago he had not questioned the constitutionality of the Bank Bill
because he had never heard any argument against it.183 He also expressed
surprise over Madison’s objection to the idea of implied powers broadening
specific grants of enumerated power, because Madison had used the doctrine
of implied powers to grant the president the power to remove subordinates
from office.184
Sedgwick was referring to a question that came up when Congress was
debating the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs185 (which was
177.
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renamed the Department of State later than year186). Madison had drafted the
Bill creating the Department, and had included a provision stating that
inferior officers could be removed by the President.187 William Smith of
South Carolina objected, noting that the Constitution included a provision for
the removal of government officers: impeachment.188 This was discussed
but rejected as unduly cumbersome. Alexander White of Virginia said that
the President could only appoint subordinate officers with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and it stood to reason that the Senate should have the
same authority regarding removal.189 White and others were concerned that
Madison’s proposal would give the President far too much power, and a
restriction on removal would prevent the President from usurping power. In
defense of his removal provision, Madison said that it would be unduly
cumbersome for the President to have to go to congress to remove
subordinates. And besides, Madison said, where “the constitution was totally
silent, Congress might use its discretion.”190 Sedgwick used Madison’s
previous argument against him.
Sedgwick said that without some degree of implied powers “the
government would be so shackled, that it would be incapable of operating….
It is universally agreed that wherever a power is delegated, for express
purposes, all the known and usual means for the attainment of the objects
expressed, are conceded also.”191 This was a paraphrase of Madison’s
argument in Federalist No. 44. Sedgwick, like most supporters of the Bank,
noted that Congress was authorized to lay and collect taxes, to borrow
money, to raise and support armies and navies, to regulate trade foreign and
domestic, and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry these out.192 A
bank would be very useful in carrying out those enumerated powers. He then
asked rhetorically if banks were not “the most useful engines to facilitate the
collection of taxes, [and] borrowing money”?193
Sedgwick said that in the Constitution the great ends of government
were particularly enumerated, but all the means were not, nor could they all
be pointed out, “without making the constitution a complete code of laws.
Some discretionary power and reasonable latitude must be left to the
judgment of the legislature.”194 Congress had the power to lay and collect
186. Ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68 (1789).
187. The Debate over removal and the Foreign Office is in 11 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 860–69, 921–
27, 986–88, 1031–33.
188. Id. at 860–61.
189. Id. at 872.
190. Id. at 867–68.
191. 14 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 399.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 409–10.
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taxes, and the means were left to the honest and sober discretion of the
legislature, and in its discretion a bank was what was needed.195 He reminded
everyone that the Bank of North America had saved the nation from
bankruptcy during the Revolution: “without its kind aid the wheels of
government would have stopped and the dawn of freedom never have been
followed by the sun-shine of liberty.”196
John Laurance spoke again, and noted the lack of public comment or
outcry against the Bank. “The silence of the people on the subject now before
the House is strongly presumptive that the measure of a bank is not
considered by them as unconstitutional.”197 He also reiterated that the
government under the Articles of Confederation had very limited powers, yet
they chartered a bank, and the states had passed laws re-chartering the bank,
not eliminating it.198 He said that he believed that the majority of the
Congress of the Confederation did not believe that the Bank Act was
unconstitutional, “but considered it warranted by a liberal construction of the
powers with which they were entrusted.”199 He said that full power to
“regulate the fiscal concerns of this union is a primary consideration in this
government, and from hence it clearly follows, that it must possess the power
to make every possible arrangement conducive to that great object.”200 He
noted that one of the chief defects of the Confederation was its inability to
deal with these sorts of situations.201 The preamble to the Constitution says
that the purpose of the new government is to create a more perfect union, as
compared to the imperfect union governed under the Articles of
Confederation, and “to suppose that this government does not possess the
power for which the constitution was adopted, involves the grossest
absurdity.”202
Laurance, like many others, said that the question of the President’s
power to remove subordinate officers had not faced this question of
constitutionality, and removal was at least as important as the Bank. He also
noted that a number of states203 had proposed constitutional amendments that
would limit the ability of Congress to charter a commercial enterprise. This,

195. Id. at 410–11.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 403, 412. Note, the editor’s footnote 19, on page 412 notes that there were two articles
opposing the Bank, and after February 4, a few more articles opposed and raised constitutional
questions.
198. Id. at 412–13.
199. Id. at 413.
200. Id. at 403.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. At least four: New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.
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he asserted, must mean that the ratifiers in those states must have believed
that Congress currently had that power.204
James Jackson said that he had initially raised the constitutional issue
and wanted to defend his argument. He noted that there had been a few
newspapers that had argued against the Bank (but the record does not indicate
whether the criticism was based on constitutional concerns).205 He agreed
with others that if this assumption of power beyond the enumerated scope of
the Constitution was allowed, the national government “shall soon be in
possession of all possible powers.”206 He said that while states could still
charter their own banks, a national bank would “eclipse” state banks.207 He
said that Congress did not have the power to create corporations, and cited
the long history of hostility towards various types of corporations, including
ecclesiastical corporations.208
Jackson also asserted that a bank was not necessary at the moment
because commerce was flourishing.209 If a bank was needed in the future, a
future Congress could deal with the issue.210 Finally, he distinguished the
establishment of the western land office by noting that the territorial property
belonged to the nation, and the creation of a corporation in those territories
did not “interfere with the rights of any of the respective States.”211
Debate continued on February 5, with William Smith of South Carolina,
the only Southerner to vocally support the Bank, noting that the Senate had
passed the Bank Bill without raising any constitutional objections.212 He,
like other Representatives, noted that Madison had a completely different
constitutional argument regarding the question of the President’s power of
removal.213 He also noted that fiscal matters “necessarily devolve on the
general government, and . . . that every power resulting from the
acknowledged right of Congress to control the finances . . . must be as
necessarily implied, as in the case of the power of removability.”214 Because
of this, the “power to establish a national bank must reside in Congress—for
no individual State can exercise such power.”215
204. 14 DHFFC, supra note 91, at 404 (from the Gazette of United States, 9 March 91). Similarly
published in the General Advertiser, 15 February 91. Id. at 415.
205. Id. at 405.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 407.
210. Id. Jackson’s point is illogical. If the Bank was unconstitutional now, how could it become
constitutional in the future?
211. Id.
212. Id. at 421–22. See supra text accompanying notes 115–17.
213. Id. at 409.
214. Id. at 422.
215. Id. at 423.
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Michael Stone of Maryland was opposed to the Bank. Stone was a
lawyer, and though he was not a framer, as a state legislator had been
involved in the ratification of the Constitution in Maryland.216 He noted that
the split seemed to be geographic, with the southerners generally opposing
the Bank, and the northerners generally supporting it.217 He said that the
nation was united on the idea that “Congress ought not to exercise, by
implication, powers not granted by the constitution,” and felt that if Congress
started expanding on those powers now it would never stop.218 He said that
if government could legislate for the “general welfare” under the Preamble,
this “doctrine would make ours but a short constitution” consisting only of
the Preamble.219
He reiterated a number of the previous arguments against the Bank, then
noted that some members said that “if we tie up the constitution too tight it
will break; if we hamper it we cannot stir; if we do not admit the doctrine [or
implied powers] we cannot legislate at all.”220 But, he said, if Congress could
do these things for expediency, convenience, or fear of war or the unknown,
then “Congress may then do anything.”221
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey was a supporter of the Bank. He was a
lawyer and had been a member of the Congress of the Confederation, but had
not been involved in either the Constitutional Convention or the ratification
convention.222 He reiterated many of the prior arguments in support of the
Bill but added that one problem with private banks was that they had limited
duration because they were partnerships which terminated at the death of any
partner, but a chartered bank corporation would have a perpetual existence.223
But, he continued, “the real issue is whether Congress has the power to
charter a bank?”224 He, like many bank supporters said that Congress had the
power to lay taxes, pay debts, and borrow money,225 and “as the constitution
had not specified the manner of borrowing, or from whom the loan was to be
obtained, the supreme legislature of the union were at liberty, it was their

216. Id. at 598–603.
217. Id. at 423. Note, Stone and a number of other Representatives refer to “eastern manufacturers” but
he is referring to the portion of the nation we would now call New England, and would refer to the
split as North versus South.
218. Id. at 424.
219. Id. at 424–25.
220. Id. at 429.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 683–87.
223. Id. at 433.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 434.
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duty, to fix on the best mode of effecting the purposes of their
appointment.”226
He listed a number of previous cases where Congress acted beyond its
expressly granted powers, including the western land office and the
President’s power of removal, but he also mentioned that the Congress of the
Confederation often exceeded its expressly enumerated powers in a number
of instances, including by dealing directly with the British during the war.227
Finally, and perhaps in an attempt to embarrass Madison, he read portions of
Federalist No. 44, including this section: “Had the convention attempted a
positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their
other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest
of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates.”228 Clearly
Congressmen were no longer deferring to Madison on matters of the meaning
of the Constitution.
The House resumed debate on Monday, February 7, 1791. William
Giles summarized and repeated a number of his and other opponents’
arguments,229 but added that the economy was currently “flourishing”
without a bank, so he could see no need for one.230
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was the only framer to speak in
support of the Bank Bill. Gerry was an interesting case. He had attended the
Constitutional Convention and had been a vocal participant but was known
for being blunt, argumentative, and thin skinned.231 He was generally
supportive of a strong central government, but refused to sign the final
version of the Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights, and in his view
created a government that was not sufficiently representative of the people.232
He was a leading opponent of ratification in the Massachusetts legislature
because of his concerns about the lack of adequate representation, ambiguous
legislative powers, and lack of clarity between legislative and executive
powers.233 After the Constitution was ratified, he ran for Congress noting
that he supported the general outlines of the Constitution and felt that the
defects he raised could be corrected by amendments.234 Once elected, he

226. Id. at 435.
227. Id. at 437–38.
228. Id. at 437–44. Note, The Federalist Papers were first published in a single book in 1788 and was
well known to the public.
229. Id. at 446.
230. Id. at 447–51.
231. COLLIER, supra note 18, at 236–38.
232. Id. at 355–56.
233. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 283–84.
234. 14 DHFCC, supra note 91, at 621.
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supported most of Hamilton’s economic programs and favored a strong
central government.235
Gerry began by noting that Madison “has long decided against the
authority of Congress to establish a bank, and is therefore prejudiced against
the measure.”236 He suggested that Madison’s “rules being made for the
occasion, are the result of his interpretation, and not his interpretation of the
rules.”237 Gerry disagreed with Madison’s suggestion that the Constitution
should be interpreted based on the intent of the framers, and suggested that
the rules of interpretation by Blackstone might be a better guide, because they
were familiar to everyone and were commonly used to interpret laws and
statutes.238 Blackstone, according to Gerry, said that the fairest and most
rational method to determine the will of the legislature is “by signs the most
natural and probable, and these signs are either the words, the context, the
subject matter, the effect and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the
law.”239 With respect to words, Blackstone observed that “they are generally
understood in their usual and most ordinary signification.”240 Gerry said that
the only word truly at issue was “necessary.”241 He said that the meaning of
the word “varies according to the subject and circumstances.”242 For
example, if there is not enough specie available in circulation it would be
necessary for Congress to create paper money, but if there is enough specie
then script is not necessary.243
If the meaning is still in doubt, Blackstone advised looking at the
context, and noted that in England the preamble of a law was often used to
construe an act of parliament.244 Gerry read the Preamble and said that the
“common defense and general welfare” are held up as “the primary objects
of” the new Government.245 He said that preparation for defense involves
preparing for emergencies, which necessitates the ability of government to
obtain “a sufficient sum of money, which is justly denominated the sinews
of war.”246 How is this to be achieved? One solution was taxes, which are
either “too slow in their operations” to deal with an emergency, or onerously
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high to create a surplus for future needs.247 The only other option was
through the ability to obtain loans.248 But what then? “Are we to apply to
the banks already established in the states for loans?”249 These may not be
reliable, or the money not available. “Are we to apply to foreign banks or
individuals?”250 These are also not reliable, and could leave the nation
beholden to hostile powers. It “must be evident that a previous arrangement
to aid loans in cases of emergency is necessary and proper in the general and
popular use of the term, . . . and what previous arrangement can we make so
proper as that of a national bank?”251
Blackstone’s last rule was that “the most universal and effectual way of
discovering the true meaning of a law when the words are dubious, is by
considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the
legislature to enact it.”252 Gerry asserted that the causes which produced the
Constitution were “an imperfect union, want of public and private justice,
internal commotions, a defenseless community, neglect of the public welfare
and dangers to our liberties.”253 He said that these are set out in the Preamble,
but are also known to the members of the House from “our own knowledge
of the history of the times that preceded the establishment” of the
Constitution.254
If these weighty causes produced the constitution . . . shall we listen to
assertions that these words [necessary and proper] have no meaning and
that the new constitution has no more energy than the old? Shall we thus
unnerve the government, [and] leave the union, as it was under the
confederation, defenseless [against enemies] and thus relinquish protection
of its citizens? Or shall we, by a candid and liberal construction of the
powers expressed in the constitution, promote the great and important
objects thereof? . . . I shall without hesitation choose the latter and leave the
people and the states to determine whether or not I am pursing their true
interests.255

Gerry noted that Madison “has urged the dangerous tendency of a
liberal construction. But which is most dangerous a liberal or a destructive
interpretation?”256 Besides, he continued, “If it is enquired where we are to
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drawn the line of a liberal construction, I would also enquire, where the line
of restriction is to be drawn?”257
Gerry also noted that Madison referred to the pending amendment that
provided that the powers not delegated to Congress or prohibited to the states
shall rest in the states, or the people.258 To this Gerry asked, what powers are
delegated?259 Gerry raised the issue of removal. “As the constitution is silent
on this subject, the power mentioned, by the gentleman’s own reasoning, is
vested in the states or the people.”260 The record does not indicate if he
pressed the point, but his implication is obvious: it makes no sense that the
power of removal would belong to the states or the people, since it would be
cumbersomely difficult, if not impossible, for them to execute it. Gerry does
note that Madison “contended for an assumption of the power, and when
assumed urged that it should be vested in the President,” despite the
objections of “a respectable minority in both Houses” who thought the power
should belong to “the President and the Senate,” like the power of
appointment.261 “His rule of interpretation then, was therefore more liberal
than it is now.”262 And giving assumed powers to the President could
produce far more dangerous results. “If we have this right in one instance,
we may extend it to others and make him a despot.”263
Next, Gerry addressed Madison’s assertion that the meaning of the
terms can be determined “by the sense of the federal convention.”264 How,
he asked, “is this to be obtained?” Are “we to depend on the memory of the
gentleman for a history of their debates and from thence to collect their
sense?”265 This would be improper, Gerry suggested, “because the memories
of different gentlemen would probably vary, as they have already done, with
respect to” that history.266 And even if memories agreed, “the opinions of
the individual members who debated are not to be considered as the opinions
of the convention. Indeed if they were, no motion was made in that
convention, and therefore none could be rejected, for establishing a national
bank.”267 He noted that Madison had mentioned the power to grant charters
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and said that this “was a proposition . . . to enable Congress to erect
commercial corporations which was and always ought to be negative.”268
Gerry said that reference to the state ratifying conventions was even
more suspect because the records were imperfect.269 He specifically noted
that reports from some states were from only one side of the debate.270 There
was a vigorous debate in all the states, and any one sided description clearly
implies the wrong thing. In addition, “the speech of one member is not to be
considered as expressing the sense of a convention.”271 Such speeches were
meant to sway, and were not even-tempered or analytical discussion of the
subject. The:
union was at the time divided into two great parties, one of which feared the
loss of the union, if the constitution was not ratified unconditionally, and
the other the loss of our liberties, if it was. The object on either side was so
important, as perhaps to induce the parties to depart from candor, and to call
in the aid of art, flattery, professions of friendship, promises of offices, and
even good cheer, were recurred to . . . . Under such circumstances the
opinions of great men ought not to be considered as authorities, and in many
instances could not have been recognized by themselves.” 272

Gerry also noted that Madison read from The Federalist to support his view,
but “this part of his performance I consider as political heresy. His doctrine
indeed, was calculated to lull the consciences of those who differed in
opinion with him at that time, and having accomplished his object, he is
probably desirous that it may die with the opposition itself.”273
Gerry closed by reiterating a number of arguments made by others: the
Congress of the Confederation chartered a bank and the states and people had
not objected; a number of states proposed amendments prohibiting Congress
from establishing commercial corporations, which indicated that they
thought Congress had that power; and the Bill does not create a monopoly
since it does not prevent states from chartering a bank.274
John Vining again spoke in support of the Bill. He noted that Madison
said that this Bill conflicted with the sense of the Federal Convention, but
pointed out that the members of the Senate who had been in attendance at the
convention had raised none of Madison’s objections.275 This, he indicated,
268.
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would mean that they did not have the same sense of the Federal Convention
as Madison.276
Madison rose to give it one last try. He said that the power to grant a
bank charter is significant, and such an important power should be
specifically enumerated and not implied or allowed under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.277 He said that a bank would certainly be useful for collecting
taxes and borrowing money, but that did not mean it was necessary.278 He
also denied that a national bank would play any role in regulating
commerce.279 He reiterated his belief that the use of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in this instance could give Congress unlimited powers in the
future, and attempted to distinguish the cases of the western land office, the
president’s power of removal, and the Confederation’s chartering of the Bank
of North America, but was essentially repeating his and others previous
arguments.280
Gerry rose one more time to respond to Madison, but, according to the
newspaper report, “the house discovering an impatience to have the main
question put” he sat down.281 The Bill to Charter the First Bank of the United
States was put to a vote. The first question was whether the matter was ready
to be voted on, and the House said yes thirty-eight to twenty.282 The Bill
itself was then voted on, and passed thirty-nine to twenty.283 All who voted
against it were from the South, except Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts.284
Most of the votes for the Bank were from the North, except John Sevier and
John Steele of North Carolina, William Smith of South Carolina, and Joshua
Seney and William Smith of Maryland.285
There were eight Framers in the House when the Bank Bill was voted
on: five supported the Bank and three opposed it.286 Those framers who
voted for the Bank Bill, and therefore voted in favor of a more expansive
view of the powers of government, were George Clymer of Pennsylvania,
Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts,
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Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, and Roger Sherman of Connecticut.287
Those framers who voted against the Bank Bill, and therefore essentially
supported Madison’s views of strictly limited powers of government, were
Daniel Carroll of Maryland, James Madison of Virginia, and Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina.288 Of the framers who supported the Bill,
only Gerry spoke at length, and of the framers who opposed the Bill, only
Madison spoke at length. And not only did they take different sides on the
Bank Bill, but their recollections of the specific debates and general sense of
the Constitutional Convention were quite different.
Tallying up all the members of Congress, both House and Senate, of the
eighteen framers present, thirteen supported the Bank and five opposed it.
From the debate in the House we see that the framers clearly had different
opinions on the powers of Congress and the issue of enumerated versus
implied powers. We also see that they were not swayed by the opinions of
Madison as to Constitutional meaning, perhaps because it was clear that his
views were not consistent or impartial, or perhaps because they had come
away from the Constitutional Convention with a different understanding of
its purpose and meaning.
IV. WASHINGTON REQUESTS ANALYSIS
The House passed the Bank Bill on February 8, 1791, and sent it to
President George Washington for his signature. Washington was well aware
of the debate in the House, and respected Madison and his views, so he felt
he needed to fully address the question of constitutionality.289 He asked for
the opinions of three of his main advisers, Attorney General William
Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander Hamilton.290
A. Attorney General Edmund Randolph Opposes the Bank
Washington asked Attorney General Randolph for his views first.
Opining on such matters was one of the duties proscribed to the Attorney
General by the Judiciary Act of 1789.291 Randolph was a major participant
in the Constitutional Convention. He was one of the authors of, and the chief
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spokesman for, the Virginia Plan.292 But Randolph had also been the author
of the Bill to Create the Bank of North America in the Congress of the
Confederation in 1781, and the author of a detailed committee report arguing
the necessity of that bank.293 Despite that, Randolph, like most Southerners,
opposed the Bank.
Randolph delivered his opinion to the President on February 12, 1791.
The opinion was in two parts, the first setting out Randolph’s Constitutional
analysis, and the second his critique of the major arguments raised during the
debate in the House.294 He began by noting that “if any part of the Bill does
either encounter the Constitution or is not warranted by it, the clause of
incorporation is the only one.”295 The power to create a corporation is not
expressly given to Congress. “If it can be exercised by them, it must be; 1st.
because the nature of the federal government implies it; or 2d. because it is
involved in some of the specified powers of legislation; or 3. because it is
necessary and proper to carry into execution some of the specified
powers.”296
Randolph went through each point in order. “To be implied in the
nature of the federal government would beget a doctrine so indefinite, as to
grasp every power.”297 This mirrors the opponents’ arguments in the House.
He noted that it is not uncommon for government without a written
constitution to operate in every area that the government sees fit.298 Where,
however, the government is created by a written constitution, the question
becomes the degree to which the government is bound by the document. He
noted the recent amendment reserving power to the states, to reflect the desire
to limit the powers of Congress.299 Despite this, he asked whether “upon any
principle of fair construction, the specified powers of legislation involve the
power of granting charters of incorporation?”300 Since it is not expressed,
can it be implied? He said no because “a constitution . . . is to be construed . . .
with a closer adherence to the literal meaning.” And here it cannot be found
within the literal meaning of the Constitution.301
292. Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinion, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 116 (1994).
293. Id. at 115.
294. EDMUND RANDOLPH, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BANK BILL (1791), reprinted
in Dellinger & Powell, supra note 292. Note, I was unable to find a copy of the full opinion in any
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Next, he analyzed whether a bank charter can be allowed under other
specifically enumerated powers, and looked at the four most commonly cited
provisions, the power to tax, to borrow, to regulate commerce, and the
general powers within the Preamble.302
Randolph noted that the advocates of the Bill said that the ability to
create a bank lies in “the power to lay & collect taxes . . . because it facilitates
the payment of them.”303 He admitted that a bank might make laying and
collecting taxes convenient, but there are certainly other ways to do it, so it
is not necessary.304 The specific taxing powers, according to Randolph,
include the power to (1) “ascertain the subject of taxation” (2) “declare the
quantum of taxation” (3) “prescribe the mode of collection;” and (4) “ordain
the manner of accounting for the taxes.”305 This does not include the power
to create a bank, therefore Congress lacks that power.
Second, Congress has the power to “borrow money on the credit of the
United States.”306 A bank, according to its advocates, facilitates the
“borrowing money; because it creates an ability to lend.”307 This includes
the ability to (1) “stipulate a sum to be lent,” (2) determine whether “interest,
or no interest to be paid,” and (3) determine “the time and manner of
repayment, unless the loan be placed on an irredeemable fund.”308 Randolph
did not find the power to lend in his list of powers appended to the power to
borrow, so he concluded that Congress lacks the power to create a bank based
on the power to borrow.
Third, Congress has the “power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”309 In
Randolph’s view, this must include the power to
prohibit [foreign nations] or their commodities from our ports . . . [and] to
imposed duties on them, where none existed before, or to increase existing
duties on them, . . . to subject them to any species of custom house
regulations, or to grant them any exemptions or privileges which policy may
suggest.310

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. Note, Randolph’s argument has been reorganized for clarity.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.

430

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

He then noted the various powers relating to dealing with Indian tribes
and the property and territories of the United States.311 The advocates of a
bank said that it is necessary to regulate commerce, “because it increases the
medium of circulation, and thus encourages activity [and] industry.”312
Again this does not fall within Randolph’s list of powers, so he rejected the
reasoning. He noted that the
Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of
power . . . To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble
if it be operative is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the
Constitution is useless; but that it is declarative only of the views of the
convention, which they supposed would be best fulfilled by the powers
delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of preambles.313

This also mirrors comments made by Representative Stone and others in the
Congressional debates. Randolph noted that while the Bank might not be
allowed under each asserted power:
[I]n truth, the serious alarm is in the concentered force of these sentiments.
If the laying and collecting of taxes brings with it every thing which, in the
opinion of Congress, may facilitate the payment of taxes; . . . if to regulate
commerce is to range in the boundless mazes of projects for the apparently
best scheme to invite from abroad, or to diffuse at home, the precious
metals; if to dispose of or to regulate property of the United States, is to
incorporate a bank, that stock may be subscribed to it by them, it may
without exaggeration be affirmed that a similar construction on every
specified federal power, will stretch the arm of Congress into the whole
circle of state legislation.314

Finally, he looked at whether chartering a bank can fall under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. “To be necessary is to be incidental, or in
other words may be denominated the natural means of executing a power.
The phrase, ‘and proper,’ if it has any meaning, does not enlarge the powers
of Congress, but rather restricts them.”315 Randolph concluded with his
general determination that “[i]n every aspect therefore under which the
attorney general can view the act, so far as it incorporates the Bank, he is
bound to declare his opinion to be against its constitutionality.”316
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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In the second portion of the opinion Randolph addressed some of the
other arguments raised in the House debate. He began by noting that some
opponents of the Bill suggested “a rule of construction, adverse to the power
of incorporation, springs out of the Constitution itself,” because “after the
grant of certain powers to Congress, the Constitution, . . . specially grants
several other [subsidiary] powers . . . .”317 For example, after granting
Congress the power to regulate commerce, the Constitution also sets out the
power to establish laws of bankruptcy, to set standards for weight and
measure, and to establish post offices and post roads.318 But Randolph stated
that this does not necessarily follow from what happened at the Convention319
Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily perceive
the force of what is expressed in the letter of the convention, “That the
Constitution was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual deference &
concession.” To argue, then, from its style or arrangement, as being
logically exact, is perhaps a scheme of reasoning not absolutely precise.320

Randolph explained,
[t]hese similar powers, on which stress is laid, are either incidental or
substantive . . . independent powers. If they be incidental powers, and the
conclusion be that, because some incidental powers are expressed, no others
are admissible, it would not only be contrary to the common forms of
construction, but would reduce the present Congress to the feebleness of the
old one, which could exercise no powers not expressly delegated.321

Randolph addressed Madison’s suggestion that constitutional
interpretation should be based on deducing the intent of the framers, and
found the idea without merit because the historical record is lacking.322
“What may not be the consequence if an almost unknown history should
govern the construction?”323 He then discussed whether the ratification
debates could offer some insight, but found this equally implausible.324 He
said that “these have no authoritative influence,” because it “ought . . . to be
remembered that observations were uttered by the advocates of the
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Constitution” to ensure ratification, and implies that the ratification debates
are therefore not necessarily unbiased or reliable.325
Finally, Randolph addressed the issues of the Western land office and
the presidential power of removal. He noted the Constitution states that
Congress has the power to regulate the territories and so could create the land
office, but then concedes that on the question of removal, both sides have a
point.326 But it was his opinion that Congress must have the power of
removal, though he did not explain why.327
B. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson Opposes the Bank
Washington asked his Secretary of State for his opinion next. Thomas
Jefferson was the main author of the Declaration of Independence, and an
important founder but was not involved in the Constitutional Convention. He
was the minister to France when the Constitution was drafted, and so had no
direct involvement in its creation.
1. Jefferson Opposes the Bank
Jefferson delivered his opinion to President Washington on February
15, 1791.328 Jefferson began with a broad statement of his views on the
nature of the government under the Constitution:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That
“all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.”329
To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around
the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power,
no longer susceptible of any definition. 330

Jefferson then turned to the Bank Bill. “The incorporation of a bank,
and the powers assumed by this Bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated
to the United States, by the Constitution.”331 First, “they are not among the
325.
326.
327.
328.
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See THOMAS JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL FOR ESTABLISHING A
NATIONAL BANK (1791), reprinted in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275–81 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1974).
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powers specially enumerated.”332 He then set out and analyzed the
constitutional provisions which the supporters suggest gives Congress the
authority to create a bank.333 The first justification is the “power to lay taxes
for the purpose of paying the debts of the United States,” but Jefferson noted
“no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid.”334 He also noted that were this
a “bill to raise money, its origination in the Senate would condemn it by the
Constitution.”335 The second justification is the power to borrow money, but
Jefferson noted “this bill neither borrows money nor ensures the borrowing
it. The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any other money holders,
to lend or not to lend their money to the public.”336 The third justification is
the Commerce Clause. Jefferson said,
[t]o erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who
erects a bank, creates a subject of commerce in its bills; so does he who
makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines; yet neither of
these persons regulates commerce thereby . . . . Accordingly the bill does
not propose the measure as a regulation of trade, but as “productive of
considerable advantages to trade.” Still less are these powers covered by
any other of the special enumerations. 337

Jefferson next addressed whether a bank can be created under the taxing
authority. He analyzed what it meant to “lay taxes for the purpose of
providing for the general welfare.”338 Jefferson said that the supporters’
reading of this phrase
would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a
Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United
States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would
be also a power to do whatever evil they please. 339

Finally he addressed whether a bank could be created under the powers
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. He said that the enumerated
powers “can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank therefore
is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.”340
Jefferson noted that the proponents of the Bank said “that a bank will give
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
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great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes.”341 This may be true,
but
the Constitution allows only the means which are ‘necessary,’ not those
which are merely ‘convenient’ . . . . If such a latitude of construction be
allowed to this phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to
everyone, for there is not one which ingenuity may not torture into a
convenience in some instance or other, to some one of so long a list of
enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and
reduce the whole to one power,

as set out under the Preamble.342 He concluded by stating,
[i]t may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the
States, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a
single State. . . . But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that
there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or that the world
may not go on very well without it.343

2. Jefferson and Constitutional Purity
Jefferson was considered the founder of the concept of “strict
construction” and he based his campaign for the Presidency in 1800 on the
idea that the Federalists had strayed from the original meaning of the
Constitution.344 Many historians have labeled the election of 1800 as the
“Revolution of 1800,” because it so dramatically shifted the government
from the Hamiltonian views held by the Federalists, to the views of limited
government held by Jefferson and his allies.345 Despite this, it is important
to remember that Jefferson’s idea of “strict construction” was somewhat
situational, because he was willing to ignore the clear words of the
Constitution when it suited his purposes.346 The most notable case involves
the Louisiana Purchase.347 Jefferson knew that the Constitution did not

341.
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authorize him to take this action, yet he did it anyway.348 He explained this
in a letter to John C. Breckinridge on August 12, 1803:
The constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory,
still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive in
seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of their
country, have done an act beyond the Constitution. . . . It is the case of a
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important
adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, I did this for your good; I
pretend to no right to bind you: you may disavow me, and I must get out of
the scrape as I can: I thought it my duty to risk myself for you. 349

So Jefferson’s opinions on the meaning of, and fidelity to, the Constitution
are, like Madison’s, situational.
C. Hamilton’s Response
After receiving the opinions from Randolph and Jefferson, Washington
asked his Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, for his opinion.
Hamilton, as noted above, had been a driving force behind the call for the
Constitutional Convention and had been a major participant in the
Convention. Washington gave Hamilton the reports from Randolph and
Jefferson. Hamilton spent nearly a week working on the response, and as was
his wont, he provided a voluminous analysis.
Hamilton began by noting that he had drafted the original Bill, so his
opinion might be suspect.350 He then jumped right in and addressed
Randolph’s assertion that Congress does not have the power to create a
corporation.351 Hamilton said,
every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes
. . . a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the
attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by
restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or
not contrary to the essential ends of political society.352

348. Id.
349. Id.
350. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A BANK
(1791), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 98 (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1961).
351. Id.
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436

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

He asserted “it is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect
corporations.”353 He does not specifically articulate why, but we may assume
that he is referring to the historic powers of government, because he goes on
to assert that “where the authority of the government is general, it can create
corporations in all cases, [but] where it is confined to certain branches of
legislation, it can create corporations only in those cases.”354
It is not denied that there are implied as well as express powers [in the
Constitution], and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter.
. . . [The] power of erecting a corporation may as well be . . . employed as
an instrument or mean of carrying into execution any of the specified
powers, as any other instrument or mean whatever. The only question must
be . . . whether the mean to be employed . . . has a natural relation to any of
the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government. Thus a
corporation may . . . be erected in relation to the collection of taxes, or to
the trade with foreign countries . . . because it is the province of the federal
government to regulate those objects.355

He disagreed with Jefferson’s definition of “necessary.” Jefferson had
stated “no means are to be considered as necessary but those without which
the grant of the power would be nugatory.”356 Hamilton said that according
to both the grammatical and popular sense,
necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful,
or conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is
necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing
more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government or
person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing. 357

He suggested that the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause make
it clear “that it was the intent of the Convention . . . to give a liberal latitude
to the exercise of the specified powers.”358 He suggested that it is as
dangerous to read the Constitution literally (that is strictly) as it is to read the
Constitution liberally (that is broadly).359 “The moment the literal meaning
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is departed from, there is a chance of error and abuse. And yet an adherence
to the letter of its powers would at once arrest the motions of government.”360
He suggested that the way to resolve this is to look separately at the
ends, and the means of achieving those ends.361 “If the end be clearly
comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have
an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular
provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the
compass of the national authority.”362 This is a subtle restating of Madison’s
argument in Federalist No. 44, which stated, “wherever the end is required,
the means are authorized.”363 Hamilton suggested an additional criterion:
“Does the proposed measure abridge a pre-existing right of any State or of
any individual?”364 If not, then “there is a strong presumption in favor of its
constitutionality.”365 And here, he noted, the Bill does not prevent the states
from “erecting as many banks as they please.”366
Hamilton concluded by stating that based on the forgoing analysis, “the
power to erect corporations is not to be considered as an independent or
substantive power, but as an incidental and auxiliary one, and was therefore
more properly left to implication, than expressly granted.”367 Hamilton then
explained that a bank is simply incidental to enumerated powers.368 “A bank
relates to the collection of taxes in two ways indirectly, [1] by increasing the
quantity of circulating medium and quickening circulation, which facilitates
the means of paying directly, [2] by creating a convenient species of medium
in which they are to be paid.”369 A bank is directly related to borrowing
money, “because it is an usual, and in sudden emergencies an essential,
instrument in the obtaining of loans to government.”370 A bank is important
for raising money during wartime because it may take far too long to raise
taxes or obtain loans from other countries.371
The institution of a bank has also a natural relation to the regulation of trade
between the States, in so far as it is conducive to the creation of a convenient
medium of exchange between them, and to the keeping up a full circulation,
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by preventing the frequent displacement of the metals in reciprocal
remittances. `Money is the very hinge on which commerce turns.372

D. Washington Signs the Bank Bill
After reading and contemplating the three opinions, Washington signed
the Bill that created the Bank of the United States on February 25, 1791.373
Washington left no record of his reasoning, but we do know that he had been
long concerned with the ability of the government to deal with commercial
interests, including through his involvement with the Annapolis
Convention.374 Washington was also the presiding officer at the
Constitutional Convention, and so was undoubtedly familiar with the
arguments made during the debate over the Constitution. Based on that
experience, and after reviewing the opinions supporting and opposing the
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, George Washington
essentially endorsed Hamilton’s expansive view on the powers of the
national government.375
V. FRAMERS FOR AND FRAMERS AGAINST
There were fifty-five men who attended the Constitutional Convention,
though only thirty-eight signed the final document.376 Of those fifty-five
men, twenty-one were in the first federal government, including President
Washington, Treasury Secretary Hamilton, Attorney General Randolph, ten
senators, and eight members of the House of Representatives.377 Of those
twenty-one men, sixteen supported the Bank, and five opposed it.378
The advocates of limited government like to quote Madison’s comment
from Federalist No. 45, with the implication that this was somehow the
consensus view of the Framers. But the debate over the First Bank of the
United States indicates that a majority of the framers did not support
Madison’s views on limited government.379 Many actually seemed to favor

372. Id.
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CHANGE 31 (5th ed. 2009).
377. Id.
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a larger and more active government.380 It should also be noted that many,
as indicated above, did not share Madison’s view of constitutional
interpretation, or his recollection of the events at the Constitutional
Convention.381
The Bank of the United States quickly became an important economic
player in the new nation, and eventually was the largest single commercial
enterprise in the country.382 So a majority of the “framers” created a
government owned enterprise that was the largest commercial enterprise in
the nation. This is hardly an endorsement of limited government.
VI. THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
The charter for the First Bank of the United States ran until March 4,
1811. As it neared expiration, supporters began to discuss a new charter.
James Madison was now President. Madison had seen the impact of the Bank
on the new nation, and while he still harbored doubts about its
constitutionality, he could not doubt its effectiveness.383 But as the charter
for the First Bank neared termination, Madison knew that he would be
ridiculed if he endorsed its recharter, so he turned to his Treasury Secretary
Albert Gallatin, to push the Bill.384
The first bill to arrive at his desk to recharter the Bank contained what
Madison considered to be significant defects, so he vetoed the Bill.385 But in
his veto message to Congress he explained that he no longer challenged the
constitutionality of the Bank:
Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to
establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by
repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an
institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the

380. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR, 1765–1865, at 160–69 (Vintage Books, 1958).
381. See id.
382. DAVID JACK COWEN, THE ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1791-97, at xxiv (Routledge, 2000).
383. Id.
384. ROBERT ALLAN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 235–36 (University of
Missouri Press, 1987).
385. JAMES MADISON, VETO MESSAGE TO SENATE, JANUARY 30, 1815, reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE,
INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED (Gaillard
Hunt, ed., 1908).
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Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a
concurrence of the general will of the nation, . . . 386

Madison’s statement does not sound like a person who believed in strict
construction or rigid application of the words of the Constitution. Instead,
Madison’s statement sounds like a person who believed that the Constitution
was amenable to the times, a living document.
Congress re-worked the Bank Bill and returned it to Madison’s desk.387
This time Madison signed it, on April 10, 1816, without comment.388
In the course of his public career, Madison embraced broad powers of
the national government (under the Virginia plan), limited powers of
government (in his opposition to the first Bank Bill), and in the end the
concept of a living constitution (in his veto message on the Second Bank
Bill).
The constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States was
challenged in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland.389 The case involved an
attempt by the state of Maryland to tax bank notes not created by banks
chartered in Maryland.390 The true purpose of the law was not to raise taxes,
but rather to attack the Bank of the United States by burdening it with this
tax.391 McCulloch was the director of the Baltimore branch of the bank, and
when he refused to pay the tax, the state sued.392 The case wound its way
through the courts and the Supreme Court eventually ruled in 1819. Chief
Justice John Marshall’s opinion essentially tracked Hamilton’s argument that
Congressional powers must be broad enough to get the job done. He noted
that Congress did not have the express powers to charter a bank, but it had
certain implied powers, and under the Necessary and Proper Clause it can
use those implied powers to expand on enumerated powers.393
Two points are notable about Chief Justice Marshall. First, Marshall
was a Federalist, and throughout his political and judicial career he supported
a broad interpretation of the Constitution. Second, Marshall was also a
ratifier, having taken a leading role in ratification of the Constitution in
Virginia. So Marshall was familiar with the debates over the scope of the
power of the federal government.394 And in making his decision, Marshall
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had this knowledge, as well as the weight of the framers in the First Congress,
on his side.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Conservative justices, as well as politicians and political commentators,
seem to suggest that there was a well-defined consensus on the Framers’
understanding of the Constitution. But as we have seen, at least two framers,
Elbridge Gerry and Edmund Randolph, stated that this was simply not the
case. Conservative justices also like to quote Madison as if he were the oracle
of Philadelphia, with intimate and encyclopedic knowledge of the framing of
the Constitution. But as we have also seen, Madison’s contemporaries did
not hold him in quite that high regard. Conservative justices also seem to
imply that the consensus of the framers was that the government was to be
limited and constrained to strictly enumerated powers. The fight over the
First Bank of the United States shows, in one neat package, that the historical
record simply does not support any of these contentions.
APPENDIX
Chart 1. The Members of the First Senate in 1790
Name

Framer/Ratifier/Position

State

Bassett, Richard

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

Delaware

Butler, Pierce

Framer, not ratifier, Opposed

South Carolina

Carroll, Charles

Ratifier, supported

Maryland

Dalton, Tristram

Ratifier, supported

Massachusetts

Dickinson,
Philemon

Neither, unknown

Ellsworth, Oliver

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

Connecticut

Elmer, Jonathan

Neither, unknown

New Jersey

Few, William

Framer & Ratifier, Opposed

Georgia

Foster, Theodore

Ratifier, supported

Rhode Island

New Jersey
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Gunn, James

Ratifier

Georgia

Hawkins,
Benjamin

Ratifier, Opposed

Henry, John

Neither, but supported

Maryland

Izard, Ralph

Neither, Opposed

South Carolina

Johnson, William
Samuel

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

Johnston, Samuel

Ratifier, supported

North Carolina

King, Rufus

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

Massachusetts

Landon, John

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

New Hampshire

Lee, Richard
Henry

Neither, believed to oppose

Maclay, William

Neither, supported

Pennsylvania

Monroe, James

Ratifier, opposed

Virginia

Morris, Robert

Framer, not ratifier, Supported

Pennsylvania

Read, George

Framer, not ratifier, Supported

Delaware

Schuyler, Philip

Ratifier, supported

New York

Stanton, Joseph,
Jr.

Ratifier, opposed

Strong, Caleb

Framer & Ratifier, Supported

Massachusetts

Wingate, Paine

Neither, supported

New Hampshire

North Carolina

Connecticut

Virginia

Rhode Island

There were ten Framers were in the First Senate: Eight Supported the Bank,
and Two Opposed.
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Chart 2. The Members of the First Congress in 1791.
Name

Framer

Vote on
Bank of
US

State

Ames, Fisher

Yes

Massachusetts

Ashe, John Baptista

No

North Carolina

Baldwin, Abraham

No

Georgia

Benson, Egbert

Yes

New York

Bloodworth, Timothy

No

North Carolina

Boudinot, Elias

Yes

New Jersey

Bourn, Benjamin

Yes

Rhode Island

Brown, John

No

Virginia

Burke, Aedanus

No

South Carolina

Cadwalader, Lambert

Yes

New Jersey

Carroll, Daniel

Framer

No

Maryland

Clymer, George

Framer

Yes

Pennsylvania

Coles, Isaac

?

Virginia

Contee, Benjamin

No

Maryland

Yes

Pennsylvania

Floyd, William

Yes

New York

Foster, Abiel

Yes

New Hampshire

Gale, George

No

Maryland

Fitzsimons, Thomas

Framer
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Yes
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Massachusetts

No

Virginia

Yes

New Hampshire

Goodhue, Benjamin

Yes

Massachusetts

Griffin, Samuel

?

Virginia

Grout, Jonathan

?

Massachusetts

Hartley, Thomas

Yes

Pennsylvania

Hathorn, John

Yes

New York

Heister, Daniel, Jr.

Yes

Pennsylvania

Huger, Daniel

?

South Carolina

Huntington, Benjamin

Yes

Connecticut

Jackson, James

No

Georgia

Laurence, John

Yes

New York

Lee, Richard Bland

No

Virginia

Leonard, George

Yes

Massachusetts

Livermore, Samuel

Yes

New Hampshire

No

Virginia

Mathews, George

No

Georgia

Moore, Andrew

No

Virginia

Muhlenberg,
Frederick

?

Muhlenberg, Peter

Yes

Gilman, Nicholas

Madison, James Jr.
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There were Eight Framers in the First Congress: Five Supported the Bank
and Three Opposed.
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Chart 3. The Framers and Their Views on the Bank of the United States.
State

Later Service

View on Bank
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Senate

Support
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Oliver Ellsworth
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Senate

Support
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Delaware
George Read
Gunning Bedford, Jr.
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jacob Broom
Georgia
William Few
Abraham Baldwin
William Houstoun*
William L. Pierce*
Maryland
James McHenry
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer
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John Lansing, Jr.*
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William R. Davie*
Alexander Martin*
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Rhode Island
Rhode Island did not send
delegates to the
Constitutional Convention.
Virginia
John Blair
James Madison Jr.

House

Opposed

George Washington

President

Supported

Attorney General
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George Mason*
James McClurg*
Edmund J. Randolph*
George Wythe*
There were fifty-five “framers” or delegates that attended the Constitutional
Convention, of which thirty-eight actually signed the document. Those
marked with an asterisk did not sign the Constitution. Of the framers, twentyone had a chance to directly weigh in on the question of the Bank of the
United States, eighteen as members of the House or Senate, and three in the
administration. Of those twenty-one, six clearly opposed the Bank, and by
implication the more expansive idea of the powers of the national
government, but fifteen supported the Bank, and by implication a broader
view of the powers of the national government under the Constitution.

